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A Statesmanship of Peace:
If Not War, Then What?
Spain – and the Next War!

by

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A Statesmanship of Peace: If Not War, Then What? Spain – and the Next War!



AM to speak to you this morning on the most difficult question that can be asked of any one who believes in peace and is opposed to war. It is the question as to what we can do when every effort to keep the peace has failed, and our enemy, who may be hostile to everything that is precious in human life—all progress, all enlightenment, all freedom—is bent on going to war. If we ourselves are not to take up arms in such a circumstance and fight in defense of what is dearest to mankind, then what are we to do?

In the Great War, for example, when the Germans came crashing through Belgium and into Flanders, what could the French and English do, whatever the ultimate causes of the conflict, but pick up the gage of battle and protect their interests? It may not have been necessary for America to enter into the fight, but how could England and France have kept out? In the present European situation, with Italy and Germany steadily pressing for the extension of Fascism, what can the democratic nations do but use every honorable means to keep the peace, and at the same time be prepared for war if the Fascists force it upon them? Take Spain as the specific and terrible example of the problem at this moment! What should the Loyalists have done when the Rebels undertook to destroy the republic? Should they have surrendered, or

run away; and, if not, what could they have done but resort to arms? What would I have done, you say, if I, a pacifist, had been in Spain; or, more particularly, if I had been a sworn officer of the free government which was placed in jeopardy? The cause of the people was as truly at stake in Spain as it was at Lexington and Concord in our own Revolutionary War. The farmers fought—why not the Spaniards—in defense of liberty?

The Question Is Valid, But Unfair

The difficulty of this question is apparent. So also, as I believe every pacifist would admit, is its validity. For it is not enough to say, on this war and peace question, that we are opposed to war. This may be the first step—to expose war, and condemn it, and try to get rid of it, and refuse to have part in it—but it certainly is not the last step. The negative attitude of opposition to war is all right as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough. In addition to opposition, there must be affirmation. A negative policy must be matched, or rather supplemented, by a positive program. There must be a statesmanship of peace to take the place of the statesmanship of war.

But if this challenge is valid, it is also, I believe, unfair, at least as offered suddenly in the hour of great crisis, when, as Kipling put it in 1914,

"The Hun is at the gate."

For a statesmanship of peace can be no mere measure of emergency. It cannot be improvised, all of a sudden, to meet some violent contingency. Like a regimen of health, it must be a long-sustained and patient program of procedure achieving step by step what one can never hope to achieve by one dramatic gesture. Imagine preparing for war for years, doing every-

thing in every case to foster war and the things that make for war, and then, when the war comes, asking the pacifist to produce a statesmanship, right out of hand, to keep the peace!

Take the nations of the modern world, for example, which have been following in arrogance and without shame those militaristic policies which every pacifist has known must sooner or later lead to catastrophe! These nations have been piling up armaments, and fortifying boundaries, and grabbing territories, and extending empires. They have been ceaselessly contriving the diplomatic snares with which to entrap their rivals, and in the end resorting to the force and violence which they have accepted as their ultimate reliance for security. Every appeal to reason they have denied; every program of goodwill they have rejected; every endeavor after peace they have either denounced as dangerous or scoffed at as quixotic. Then suddenly and terribly comes war—and instantly those responsible for the disaster turn to the pacifists, who have all along been warning against this very thing, and say, "Well, what is your policy? Haven't we got to fight? Is there anything else in honor and safety that we can do?" Which is like a man of violent and dissipated life, who finds himself stricken with a mortal disease, and frantically, at the last moment, calls upon the physician to save him from death! Is it any reproach to the physician if he throws up his hands, and says, "It's too late. There's nothing I can do. You've got to die"? If the physician had only been listened to, if he had only been summoned in time and asked to take charge of the sick-bed, he could have laid down a program of recovery which would have restored the man to health and kept him well. In the same way, if the pacifist were called early enough into international affairs, he could present a statesmanship which would banish war forever. For the pacifist

is not an idealist merely, but a realist; he is not a sentimentalist, but a scientist. He has studied sociology, mastered psychology, learned the lessons of history. Taking the world for what it is, and seeking always not the aggrandisement of any nation, not even his own, but the welfare of mankind, he has worked out policies and programs of reform to end war upon this planet. Again and again on his own initiative, in period after period of critical and dangerous events, he has presented what he has a right to call a statesmanship of peace which would have saved the world from ruin, only to see it cast aside in ridicule and scorn.

The Statesmanship of Peace—(1) Before 1914

Thus, in the years before the War of 1914, when Europe was moving precariously from one war-crisis to another, the pacifists were developing a statesmanship of peace which was not altogether unpromising. This statesmanship went back as far at least as the Brussels Peace Conference of 1864, and continued down as late as the Hague Conferences in the first decade of this present century. It did not go very deep, for men did not know as much about war in those days as we know today, but it would have eased, if not actually prevented, the successive crises which were shaking the world and might in the end have prevented the War itself. This program had three items, developed along the simpler lines of pre-War days. First, international conferences to be held from time to time to consider the problems of mankind, and their settlement in terms of the common interest! Secondly, an international court of arbitration, or adjudication, to pass upon all cases of justiciable dispute between the nations of the earth! Thirdly, and most important, progressive and universal disarmament on land or sea! This program had been well-developed by the time of the Hague conventions. There

had been successful international conferences; there had been disputes settled by arbitration; and there had been agreements for disarmament. Had there been statesmen in the world who took these policies seriously, and were willing to develop them into a statesmanship of peace as rigorous and unselfish as their own statesmanship of war, we might have avoided the disaster of 1914. But the Poincares and Sazonoffs and Von Bethman-Hollwegs and Count Berchtoldts and Sir Edward Greys were not interested. And the War came!

(2) In 1914-1916

Even then, after the War had come, there was a statesmanship of peace. It was formulated and adopted by Woodrow Wilson, and pursued by him for a period of nearly three years. While the Allied and Central Powers were locked in deadly combat, and were vying with one another in the determination to continue the struggle until one or the other had been destroyed, the American President worked patiently and persistently at his idea of ending the fight through mutual concessions and in the interest of a durable peace. His policies were simple. First, he sought to establish neutrality on the part of all the non-combatant nations, that this neutrality might be available as an agency of reconciliation whenever a suspension of hostilities could be achieved. Secondly, he sought not once but several times to persuade the Allies and the Central Powers to state their war-aims; that, by a comparison of objectives, the way to peace might be made plain. Thirdly, he sought to convince public opinion, not only in his own country but throughout the world, that the happy ending of the war would be in terms not of victory and defeat but of a drawn battle, so to speak, which would enable both sides to lay down their arms with honor and join without humiliation in the work of peace. It was in his great

"peace without victory" speech that President Wilson proclaimed the principle that "only a peace between equals can last; only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit." It was at this moment that Woodrow Wilson attained to the zenith of his statesmanship, and it was a statesmanship of peace. Had he remained faithful to this statesmanship, what benefits he might have wrought! But he abandoned it for war, for the sheer barbarism of force—"force without limit, force without stint." And a world drunk with blood swept on to the horror of Versailles!

(3) *At Versailles*

What Versailles might have been as a means of ending war is impressively suggested by the peace agreements which ended the bitterest and bloodiest war of the last century—the Civil War between the states of the United States in 1861-65. There were plenty of people who wanted a peace of vengeance at that time—the enslavement of the South, the humiliation of its people, and the destruction of its life. But the statesman in control of the victorious government in the North was Abraham Lincoln, whose heart was as tender as his mind was wise. At the famous conference with Alexander H. Stephens at Hampton Roads on February 3, 1865, Lincoln said in effect that the southern states could dictate any terms of peace which they desired, provided only that they came back into the Union and abandoned slavery. On his return to Washington he sought to make the second condition easy by proposing, after four years of treasonable war and the killing of hundreds of thousands of northern soldiers, that Congress should appropriate \$400,000,000 to pay the South for their property in slaves. General Grant manifested this same spirit when, after receiving the unconditional surrender of General

Lee, he permitted the Confederate officers to retain their side-arms, and the soldiers their horses and mules to help with the spring plowing. This was a statesmanship of peace—"with malice toward none, with charity for all . . . to bind up the nation's wounds . . . to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace."

President Wilson must have had some such statesmanship in mind when he wrote his "Fourteen Points," and in heart when he journeyed to Versailles. Think of what he might have done had he led the way, like another Lincoln, in lifting the German blockade, rushing supplies to the women and children of the conquered, confessing the mutual guilt of the War and laying upon Germany only her share of the cost of the universal ruin, strengthening the German Republic that it might be founded deep in the confidence of the German people, receiving Germany back into the family of nations, restoring her colonies, protecting the integrity of her national territories, safeguarding the pride and dignity of her citizens! This would have been a statesmanship of peace—and there were those who said so in 1919, and tried to make it so! Such statesmanship, "with malice toward none, with charity for all," would have bound up Europe's wounds, and achieved and cherished "a just and lasting peace." But Clemenceau and Orlando and Lloyd George would not have it so, and Wilson, like another Pilate, "consented"—and the world swept on into the chaos of wars and revolutions, hostilities, hatreds and despairs, which are the "black night" of our time.

(4) *After the War*

And what about this period of aftermath—this post-War period which in some ways is so much more terrible than the War itself? Was there no statesmanship of peace to undo the work of Versailles before it was too late, and thus rescue

Europe in time from the body of this death? The terms of such statesmanship were obvious—to implement the League of Nations as a true instrument of peace, to operate the World Court of International Justice as a Supreme Court of humanity, to save Germany from the crushing burden of reparations, to deliver Austria from her slow death by vivisection, to recognize Russia, to tear down tariff barriers and establish world-wide trade agreements, above all to begin that work of general disarmament which had been definitely promised to Germany as a condition of her own forced disarmament. It seemed as though such statesmanship were coming when the League took Austria under its care and tried to nurse it back to life, when America and the Allied Powers revised the reparations agreements not once but twice, especially when two great statesmen, Briand of France and Stressemann of Germany, more interested in peace than in war, and more moved by friendship than by hate, signed the Locarno Pact. It seemed as though such statesmanship had at last arrived when the nations signed in Paris the Briand-Kellogg Treaty, conceived as a noble and creative idea by our own Mr. S. O. Levinson, of Chicago, solemnly agreeing to renounce war "as an instrument of national policy."

Here was statesmanship such as the world had been waiting a thousand years to see. But it never came to anything. There was no vitality in it—as we now know, there was no real desire, no sincerity, no high resolve. Words were never made deeds; faith was never turned into fact. Treaties, agreements, pacts were all proclaimed but never practised. The statesmanship of peace failed again, but only as Christianity has failed—because it was never tried!

And Now — Spain!

Such is the record of the last two decades! Why say, in

the light of such a record, that there is no alternative to war, no policies of peace? From the beginning there has been a statesmanship of peace always available to those who would employ it—two roads wide open before the governments of the world in every crisis. Is this statesmanship to be condemned when it has never been given an opportunity to prove its worth? Is the medicine no good, because the patient refuses to take it, and then dies? Consistently for more than twenty years, as I have shown, the world has followed the road of war, and has arrived at one disaster after another. Is this a condemnation of pacifism, or is it a condemnation of militarism which has had a dozen chances to save us, and has only led us on from bad to worse?

Now we stand in the last ditch in this present Spanish crisis, which is at once the last act of the last war and the first act of the next war. And we are told, even by pacifists, that this crisis has at last discredited pacifism, which must be abandoned if democracy is not to be destroyed and the world lost. What would *you* do, I am asked, in this tremendous crisis in Spain? Take *this* riddle, and show us your statesmanship of peace!

In retort upon my adversaries, I am tempted at this point to turn the tables upon them and ask what their fighting in Spain has accomplished, or will accomplish, that may be different from what was accomplished by the fighting in the World War. One thing this fighting has already done, I grant you—it has destroyed the Spanish republic! The Loyalists have taken up arms against their enemy, and have done exactly what their enemies have desired—namely, wiped out the last vestiges of popular freedom in the land. Nay, it has done far worse than this! It has opened Spain to foreign invasion, and made the country a field of battle between

Fascists and Communists, with the Spanish people as the victims who pray for nothing quite so much as to be delivered from the war. Now that the Loyalists have adopted the methods of the Rebels, and thus met them on their own grounds and on their own terms, and like them passed over their interests to alien dictatorships, what difference does it make how the struggle finally comes out, so far as liberty and democracy are concerned? I agree with the Editor of the "Christian Century," when he denies "the assumption that the fate of democracy in all the world rests on the outcome of the present conflict. It is not true," he says; "it is even becoming questionable whether the fate of democracy in Spain itself is any longer at stake. Whatever the outcome of the present conflict in Spain, democracy there is destroyed . . . The effect of the civil war has been to destroy all prospect of democracy for years to come."*

The Story of the Spanish Republic

But I refrain from pressing this issue, though it is as important in this crisis as the similar issue was important in the crisis of 1917, when we were first induced to fight in Europe "to make the world safe for democracy." I prefer rather to meet the straight challenge of what to do in Spain if *not* to fight. The Rebels started this conflict! Would I have had the Loyalists offer no resistance, and hand over the government to General Franco?

In answer to this question, I must first of all insist upon going back to the beginning, for it is in the beginning and not in the end, as I have said, that a crisis is to be met. A statesmanship of peace, I would repeat, is not to be improvised in a moment. It must organize and lay down policies

*See issue dated January 27, 1937.

which will direct forces to peaceful and not violent ends, and thus forestall the crises which wreck society. The Loyalists in Spain, to be specific, should have handled the rebellion by foreseeing it and preventing it. They had ample time and abundant opportunity. Let me show you what I mean!

The revolution came in 1931, when Alfonso fled, and the radical Republicans were swept into power. This victory was followed by an intense effort to put into effect the provisions of the republican constitution in the face of strong conservative opposition. In 1933 came a national parliamentary election which marked a sharp swing to the Right. The Left Republicans no longer had a majority in the Cortes, and in October, 1934, the radical Republican cabinet was supplanted by a coalition of conservative Republicans, Centrists, and representatives of the Catholic Action.

Then what did the ousted radicals do? If they had been interested in peace, to say nothing of democracy, they would have accepted the verdict of the people as registered at the polls. They would have welcomed this opportunity to educate the people to the uses of majorities and minorities in a constitutional government. But they did nothing of the sort! On the contrary, the first thing they did was to declare a general strike. Then Catalonia, Asturias and the Basque areas rebelled, and declared their independence. Then Moscow intervened by ordering all Communists in Spain to join with the Left Wing parties in a United Front. All of which means that the radicals did their utmost to set a perfect example to the conservatives themselves to rebel and seek help from abroad when the radicals next came to power!

The inevitable turn in the tide came in February, 1936, when, in an election in which 9,266,000 votes were cast, 4,910,000 went to the Right, and 4,356,000 to the Left.

The radicals, in other words, were outvoted by nearly 500,000 votes—a matter of little significance, perhaps, in view of the wide corruption and popular coercion practised by the reactionary government. Under Spain's electoral laws, however, somewhat after the pattern of those in the United States, the radicals had elected 266 members of the parliament, while the Right had seated only 217 members. This gave the Left a clear majority in the Cortes, and power was thus again in their hands.

What the Loyalists Might Have Done

It was now that a statesmanship of peace was inexorably demanded. The reactionaries were bitter and intransigent. The temper of the people in large sections of the country was uncertain. The army was mutinous. Rebellion was imminent. Had not the radicals themselves set the example of rebellion? If they wanted war, they could have it. But of course they wanted peace. And why should they not have sought every conceivable means of securing peace? The way was open; it might be passable. Three things at least could have been done by the Left wing government.

In the first place, unity could have been established between the various groups, running from moderates to extremists, which composed the Left. Peace inside the government was essential to peace inside the country. The land question could have been dealt with fundamentally, in full satisfaction of peasant demands, and at the same time justly, in full recognition of the legal rights of the owners. If Lincoln insisted upon freeing the slaves, but at the same time was willing to compensate their masters, why should not the Spanish government have been willing to compensate the landlords, while rigorously expropriating their property? Law and order could have been maintained, with protection from the looting and

burning of the churches, which were symbols to the radicals of the tyranny which had kept them in subjection for centuries, but at the same time symbols to millions of the people of all the holiness and beauty they had ever known. This would have been a statesmanship of peace. Instead, the radicals were grievously divided among themselves, hopelessly confused in their administration of reform, and quite indifferent to the excesses of their fanatical followers. The exiling of the moderate and benign Zamora, the "Father of the Second Republic," who retired disillusioned to Iceland, and the assassination of Sotelo, a leader of the Right, are contrasting illustrations of the situation. Such events could only lead to civil war!

In the second place, freedom could have been granted to Spanish Morocco, or the first steps taken toward the bestowal of this freedom. The Lefts are presumably democratic; they must believe that "governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed." If they were interested in liberating the workers, there were millions of them in Africa clamoring to be freed from the yoke of Spain. To have answered this clamor, to have promised independence, to have started the work of freedom in Morocco at least half as drastically as it was started at home—this would have been a statesmanship of peace. It would also have been common-sense, for had the Lefts liberated Morocco, it would not have served as a recruiting ground for General Franco. But the Lefts did nothing of the sort. They were quite as ready as the Rights to exploit colonial possessions and build up the interests of the empire. And so they clung to Morocco—or rather left it to be seized by the Rights for their own purposes.

In the third place, the army could have been disarmed,

disbanded, and thus removed altogether from the scene. What did the Loyalists need of this old army of the king? Did they need it to suppress again the Anarchists, and Syndicalists, and Communists, as in the first days of the republic? Did they want it to garrison Morocco, and hold the Moroccans in subjection? Or did they require it to protect the government from the attacks of the reactionaries? But what reason was there to believe that this army would serve any purpose of the Loyalists, least of all that of resisting the old regime? As long as these soldiers were kept in the ranks, under the commands of their monarchist officers, they remained a source of danger to the government, as was proved by the fact that, when the civil war broke out, ninety-five per cent of them went over to the Rebels. Had they been disarmed and dismissed and disbanded and returned to the people, there is something more than a chance that they would have remained loyal. This, at any rate, would have been a statesmanship of peace—to have trusted not in arms but in the people!

The Next War—A Plan of Statesmanship

These are some of the things which might have been done by the Lefts in Spain had they been as wise as they were brave. These are the things which we wish had been done by a government which holds all our sympathy as arrayed against the most subversive and cruel powers in the modern world. Such a statesmanship of peace might not have succeeded—nothing in this world is infallible; but it could not have failed any more disastrously than the statesmanship which was actually followed. Certainly for the world tomorrow, as for Spain yesterday, there is no hope, no ultimate and enduring hope, except in statesmanship of this type—which should already now be preparing in Europe, let me say,

to prevent the next war, as it should have prepared in Spain to prevent the civil war! Already I can see the coming of this next war; already I can hear the taunts leveled at the pacifists as the trumpets blow around the world, "Well, what would you do now?" *We would not wait till "now"!* We would begin to take action today on behalf of peace, at least as vigorously as the chancellories of Europe and Asia are taking action on behalf of war, and thus by a statesmanship of peace we would forestall the war.

What is this statesmanship of peace which I would summon at this hour to meet the challenge of a war-mad world? I present it here in summary, and for the sake of convenience, in the words of the great English novelist and essayist, Mr. Aldous Huxley, as given in his famous pamphlet, "What Are You Going To Do About It?"*. It resembles a plan backed by a group of distinguished and authoritative economic and political thinkers of modern England, headed by Professor Harold Laski.

Mr. Huxley begins by dividing the nations of the world today into two groups. On the one hand are Germany, Italy, and Japan, nations which live under a sense of grievance precipitated by the War, and now prolonged by the absence of those things which are necessary to their survival—territory, natural resources, and adequate markets. These are the hungry powers which are being driven to disturbance and war by the sheer necessity of keeping alive.

On the other hand, says Mr. Huxley, are the monopolistic or satiated powers which possess between them "the greater part of the world's surface and most of the raw materials indispensable to modern industry." These powers are the

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British Empire, the United States, France, and Russia, to which must be added the subsidiary nations, Holland, Belgium, and Portugal. So long as these powers remain in possession and exclusive control of what they now own, the world must exist in a permanent state of dis-equilibrium, which must at intervals collapse into a war.

To anticipate this disaster and thus prevent the next war, Mr. Huxley offers his program of peace, which he describes as "realistic," as contrasted with the "incurably romantic" and "hopelessly chimerical" policies of the militarists. It is as follows:

"The great monopolistic powers should immediately summon a conference at which the unsatisfied powers, great and small, should be invited to state their grievances and claims. When this has been done, it would be possible, given intelligence and good will, to work out a scheme of territorial, economic and monetary readjustments for the benefit of all. That certain immediate sacrifices would have to be made by the monopolistic powers is inevitable. These sacrifices would be in part sacrifices of economic advantages, in part, perhaps mainly, of prestige—which is the polite and diplomatic word for pride and vanity. It is unnecessary to go into details here. Suffice it to say that there would have to be agreement as to the supply of tropical raw materials, an agreement on monetary policy, an agreement with regard to industrial production and markets, an agreement on tariffs, an agreement on migration."

This, may I say, is statesmanship—the only statesmanship which will save the world to peace. These are the policies of such statesmanship—the pooling of territories and raw materials, the sharing of markets, the stabilization of currency, the establishment of trade agreements, the facilitation

and wise control of immigration, to which I would add the outlawry of war, the freeing of subject peoples, and the progressive and simultaneous disarming of the great powers, all to be directed and administered by international conference, out of which would proceed in due course the political instrumentalities of a true international life! That such policies will require sacrifices goes without saying, as Mr. Huxley points out. Nothing great is ever bought except at a great price! But, says Mr. Huxley, "these sacrifices will be negligible in comparison with the sacrifices demanded by another war. Negligible in comparison even with those which are at present being demanded by the mere preparation for another war." Why not make them, in the interest of peace?

What If This Plan Fails!

But, I hear somebody say in conclusion, this is all very good, but you have not yet faced the real issue. That issue comes not when you have a chance to talk about peace, but when every hope of peace is gone. The Spanish Rebels yesterday would not have joined the Loyalists in any conference for the settlement of their differences. The European Fascists tomorrow will not join the democratic nations for the adoption of any policies of international accord. These barbarians fight. What will you do when they refuse your terms, decline to sit down in your conferences, precipitate a war, and thus destroy every last vestige of your statesmanship of peace?

The Pacifist Will Not Fight

This is our last question—the pacifist driven into the last ditch! In answer it can only be said that, while this contingency is far less possible than is imagined, it is not impossible. The Fascists may force a war upon Europe, as the Rebels forced a war upon Spain. They have this power in their hands, as any maniac has it in his hands to assassinate the

President, or blow up Washington, or set fire to New York. Mussolini or Hitler may choose to wreck our world.

But this does not mean that we must choose to join them in this work of wreckage. A maniac may choose to destroy a city or bomb a crowd, but this places no obligation upon us to aid and abet his lunacy. And that is what we do when we take up arms in answer to the challenge of a madman. All I can see in Spain today is a nation ravaged by the joint efforts of two contending forces. I see Madrid shattered, the country side burned and looted, a million innocent people slaughtered in cold blood, and no end in sight until one of the loveliest lands in Europe is turned into a desert—and all done not by Rebels alone, but by Rebels and Loyalists together. If they were working in concert and not in conflict, they could not do much worse. And this is what we are asked to extend to all of Europe if the Fascists decide to go upon the war-path. We must fight, so we are told, until a continent is laid in ruins from Warsaw to Paris, and from Berlin to Rome.

I cannot see it! I will not do it! I am too much reminded of the Roman historian, Tacitus, who wrote about the conqueror who made a desert and called it peace. So in this age we are asked to make a desert and call it liberty. Let me be frank with you! I had rather see Europe in the hands of the Fascist dictators, and her people alive, her cities still whole, her fields still fair and fertile, than to see Europe free of the Fascists, and her people slaughtered, her cities ashheaps, and her landscapes the dread haunts of wolves and brigands. In the latter case, civilization would be dead, and the last hope gone; in the former case, civilization, though in chains, would be alive—and while there's life, there's hope!

But Neither Will the Pacifist Surrender

So, you say—you would not fight, but would surrender?

You would barter liberty for life, the soul for the body, spiritual honor for mere physical survival? A cowardly choice!

Yes, I reply, a cowardly choice—if it *is* the choice! But whence comes this idea, so common among us, that surrender is the only alternative to fighting? If the conqueror draws his sword, you may fight, or you may surrender; but there is no reason, in the necessity of the case, why you should do either. For there is a third thing you may do, and I *would* do. You may resist the enemy, but not with violence. You may stand your ground against him, but not bow down. You may accept suffering, oppression, humiliation at his hand, and still endure. You may bide your time beneath his rod in the impregnable fortress of your own mind, and in secret companionship with other men likeminded with yourself, and watch and wait to win through patient heroism tomorrow what you disdain to win through force and violence today. *To fight, to surrender, to endure, these three—and the greatest of these is to endure.*

Take the situation in Spain! Suppose the Lefts had said to Franco, when the rebellion broke out: "We will not fight. We decline to plunge Spain into a civil war at your bidding. We refuse to kill our countrymen because they disagree with us, to ruin our country because it is in rebel hands, to destroy our freedom and happiness and peace in a mad struggle to preserve them. Take office, if you will; 'make good,' if you can. We won't help you; we won't cooperate with you; we won't work for you; we won't obey you. But if you want to govern — well, try it with half of the Spanish people against you to the end, and see what happens."* Had this been the word, the Rights would have taken power last June. But

*See A. J. Muste, in *Fellowship*, January, 1937, page 5

they took power in 1933, and they couldn't hold it. What evidence is there that they could hold it now, with the people outraged by open and armed rebellion against their rule? Of course, for a little while, the republic would be lost, but surely to be recovered at no distant date. Now the republic is lost for a generation, probably for a century, and the country ruined beyond recovery or repair. Which is the wiser policy in the end?

Not Surrender, but Endure—and Trust in the Highest

There is a difference between the militarist and the pacifist—the man who will not surrender but fight, and the man who will not surrender but endure—which is fundamental. It is a difference on two counts. First, the militarist has no sense of time—he lives, like a child, in the moment, and must settle things now. The pacifist on the other hand, trusts time, and thus can wait for victory. Secondly, the militarist has no reliance in anything but physical force, and therefore in every crisis, like an animal, resorts to tooth and claw. The pacifist, per contra, has reliance in certain higher qualities of mind and soul which he believes to be distinctive of himself as a man, and is convinced that he can use these weapons to achieve his ends. For are there not in the universe forces of the spirit to match his own? As the stars in their courses yesterday fought against Sisera, so are they not fighting today against Mussolini and Hitler and Franco? Why be so impatient as to believe the stars will fail, or so petty as to imagine that everything depends forever upon a sword, a machine-gun, or a bombing-plane. There are other and mightier forces, and fool or not, the pacifist will trust them to the end.